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Compelled Speech and  
the Irrelevance of Controversy 




N IFLA v. Becerra stealthily introduced a new First Amendment 
test for compelled speech that has injected chaos into the law of 
compelled disclosures.  NIFLA reinterpreted the requirement that 
compelled disclosures contain only “purely factual and uncontro-
versial information” in a way that imbued independent force into 
the “uncontroversial” component of that test.  Yet, the Court failed 
to supply criteria for what sort of purely factual information would 
fail to qualify as “uncontroversial information” and identified no 
important free speech concerns that this new prong protects. 
This Article distinguishes seven different interpretations of “un-
controversial information.”  It then assesses them to ascertain 
whether a meaningful and independent First Amendment value 
would be protected under each interpretation, making an effort not 
to conflate the stakes of compelling speech by organizations with the 
stakes for individuals.  Most address no credible, independent free 
speech concerns whatsoever.  Many of them read a disturbing intel-
lectual cowardice into the First Amendment, empowering market 
actors to refuse to acknowledge inconvenient facts.  Whether 
 
 * Pete Kameron Professor of Law and Social Justice, UCLA School of Law and Professor of 
Philosophy, UCLA.  Thanks are due to Barbara Herman, Robert Goldstein, Michael Otsuka, Larry 
Sager, and audiences at the Tim Hall Memorial Symposium at Oberlin College and the American 
Constitutional Society at UCLA for illuminating comments.  Nicole Miller and Madison Way pro-
vided superb research assistance. 
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factual, informational speech is controversial in any meaningful 
sense should be irrelevant to a First Amendment inquiry. 
Nonetheless, there are some other legitimate free speech con-
cerns about compelled disclosures, pertaining to how they are 
worded, not to the factual information they convey.  These concerns 
may be addressed without invalidating disclosure requirements.  Ar-
guably, however, the better frame for compelled disclosures that in-
volve government-scripted speech is to characterize them as gov-
ernment speech and then to resolve significant questions about when 
we may mandate that institutional speakers broadcast government 
speech.  Still, none of these questions turn on whether the informa-
tional content of the speech is controversial. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent trio of Supreme Court cases involving compelled speech in 
institutional contexts will not be celebrated in retrospect.1  Although they were 
issued on the 75th anniversary of West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette,2 none of them approached its inspiring example.  In that landmark 
compelled speech case, decided during a comparably fraught time full of anx-
iety and fear, the Court took an important stand to protect nonconformist reli-
gious minorities and articulated free speech principles that have guided deci-
sions for three quarters of a century.3  By contrast, in its most recent forays 
into the compelled speech domain, the Court’s decisions were disappointing 
both with respect to courage and legal leadership. 
Rather than decisively rejecting the broad claim that free speech princi-
ples require exemptions from anti-discrimination laws, the Court instead 
skirted the main free speech issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission4 and decided the case on a contestable set of partic-
ularized facts.5  In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Mu-
nicipal Employees, Council 31,6 the Court (again) confused money for speech 
and mistook union membership for a partisan cause.7  Rather than supporting 
efforts to prevent consumer deception and to enable meaningful, free choices 
 
 1. See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (evading 
question of whether a public accommodation statute constituted compelled speech, as applied to a 
bakery); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018) (holding 
that compelled disclosures informing women of their reproductive health choices likely violated the 
First Amendment); Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2486 (2018) (holding that requiring public-sector employees who were not part of a union to pay union 
agency fees violated the First Amendment). 
 2. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 3. See Barnette, 138 S. Ct. at 641.  Although the Court behaved admirably in Barnette by revers-
ing the disastrous course set by Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), in the same 
period, it spectacularly failed to keep its head in the face of state-fomented public panic in Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 4. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 5. One strong discussion of the Court’s evasion appears in Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartz-
man, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133 (2018). 
 6. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 7. See id. at 2464.  A more constructive perspective would have cast unions as quasi-governmen-
tal entities that enlist a quasi-adversarial structure of negotiation to help craft fair labor conditions 
within a market context.  The Court invoked a parallel perspective in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & 
Eliot, with respect to the quasi-governmental groups that case concerned.  In that case, the Court per-
mitted groups to levy funds to promote generic speech about a product to stoke demand.  521 U.S. 
457, 473 (1997). 
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about reproduction, in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra (NIFLA),8 the Court held that compelled disclosures that  informed 
women of their reproductive health choices likely violated the First Amend-
ment, in part because these disclosures, while factual, were not “uncontrover-
sial”.9  In so doing, the Court confused the contours of the speech rights of 
institutional entities providing goods and services with the speech rights of 
individuals.  Further, it injected gratuitous uncertainty about the constitution-
ality of commonplace and commonsense disclosure requirements. 
By spotlighting the category of “uncontroversial information,” without 
defining it, NIFLA has exacerbated confusion and division over the jurispru-
dential treatment of disclosure requirements in the lower courts.10  More trou-
bling, it flirts with an approach to the First Amendment that is inconsistent 
with the underlying framework of Masterpiece Cakeshop.  What made Mas-
terpiece seemingly an example of justice deferred rather than justice fore-
closed was its strong, opening reiteration of the principle that religious and 
philosophical objections to policies do not, as a general rule, provide a basis 
for exemptions to generally applicable public accommodations laws.11  This 
principle is just an instance of the more basic commitment to the rule of law; 
 
 8. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).  
 9. Id. at 2377. 
 10. See, e.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 895 (9th Cir. 2017) (de-
fining “uncontroversial” as actually accurate and factual, but upholding a preliminary injunction 
against truthful compelled health warnings about sugar because they did not specify that overcon-
sumption of sugar causes ailments); CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 
1117 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that “uncontroversial” information “refers to the factual accuracy of the 
compelled disclosure, not to its subjective impact on the audience”), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) 
(remanding the decision for reconsideration in light of NIFLA), aff’d, 928 F.3d 832, 848 (9th Cir. 
2019) (finding a compelled disclosure that “does not force cell phone retailers to take sides in a heated 
political controversy” to be uncontroversial); Evergreen Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 740 F.3d 233, 245 n.6 
(2d Cir. 2014) (explaining in dicta that Zauderer’s rational basis review of compelled commercial 
speech does not apply to a state requirement that “crisis pregnancy centers” disclose the existence of 
alternative family planning resources and their services, which include abortion, because the topic is 
politically controversial); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that a warning label requirement on video games deemed sexually explicit by the state is an 
unconstitutional compelled disclosure of a controversial message because whether a game is sexually 
explicit involves a “subjective and highly controversial” opinion which others may disagree with); 
Masonry Building Owners of Oregon v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1302 (D. Or. 2019) (under-
standing “uncontroversial” to mean not misleading); Nat’l Ass’n of Wheat Growers v. Zeise, 309 F. 
Supp. 3d 842, 851 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (understanding “uncontroversial” to mean not misleading); Serova 
v. Sony Music Entm’t, 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487, 501–02 (Ct. App. 2018) (understanding “uncontroversial 
information” to require the regulated party to agree with the recited facts). 
 11. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
[Vol. 47: 731, 2020] Compelled Speech 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
736 
special cases, special circumstances, and special burdens aside, disagreement 
with the law does not constitute a constitutionally protected permission to defy 
it, especially when that defiance diminishes the meaningful enjoyment of sig-
nificant civil and constitutional rights.  Yet, NIFLA’s confusing treatment of 
“uncontroversial information” raised the alarming prospect that mere disa-
greement with regulatory policy may be afforded unprecedented constitu-
tional significance.  This represents a confounding and unwarranted step past 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.12 
On some interpretations of its new test, NIFLA appears to read a disturb-
ing intellectual cowardice into the First Amendment.  By empowering market 
actors and service providers to refuse to acknowledge facts they would prefer 
to ignore, the case represents an alarming acceleration of the Court’s drift back 
to market libertarianism about contracting.13  On some readings, it also en-
dorses an interpretation of the First Amendment that allows disagreement with 
government policy to underwrite a First Amendment objection to complying 
with otherwise valid regulation. 
Part II describes the NIFLA opinion and analyzes what speech values are 
implicated by compelled disclosures for institutional actors, including mis-
sion-based nonprofits, and market agents.  It argues the free speech hazards 
posed by compelled speech are very different for individuals than for institu-
tional actors.  Part II then argues that NIFLA alters, without justification, the 
First Amendment requirement first announced in Zauderer that, to merit def-
erential review, compelled disclosures must just consist of “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information.”14  Whereas that phrase arguably articulated 
something bordering on a useful redundancy in Zauderer, the NIFLA Court 
newly treats this doublet as having two distinct parts that require a two-step 
 
 12. 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (upholding a compelled disclosure requirement in the context of attorney 
advertising). 
 13. The case thus adds new fuel to recent charges that the Court has reinvigorated Lochnerism 
through its First Amendment jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Oppor-
tunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174, 178–79 (Lee C. Bollinger 
& Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002); J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Ap-
proaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 384 (1990); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive 
Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 281, 286–88 (2000); Thomas H. Jackson & 
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 
VA. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (1979); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 
116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016); Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 WEST VA. L. 
REV. 867, 919 (2015); see also Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
1453 (2015) (tracking the Court’s Lochnerite premises in its recent Free Exercise jurisprudence).  
 14. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.   
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analysis.15  But, it remains murky what “uncontroversial information” means 
if it is to be treated as an independent factor that goes beyond underscoring 
“purely factual.” 
Part III goes beyond the NIFLA opinion and attempts to discern what “un-
controversial information” could mean.  It distinguishes seven distinct inter-
pretations of the “uncontroversial information” requirement and identifies 
what, correspondingly, would comprise “controversial information.” 
First, on the descriptive interpretation, “uncontroversial information” 
could underscore “purely factual” and just indicate truthful information that 
is descriptive and factual in the sense of being non-normative and not a mere 
speculative hypothesis.16  Second, on the objective interpretation, it could re-
fer to non-normative facts susceptible to classification using objective crite-
ria.17  Third, on the uncontroversial topics interpretation, it could refer to 
truthful information about matters that are not the subject of controversy.18.  
Fourth, on the relevance interpretation, it could refer to non-normative facts, 
whose relevance with respect to the intended audience’s decisions is not con-
tested or controversial.19  Fifth, on the uncontested interpretation, it could refer 
to non-normative facts, the truth of which is not a matter of controversy.20  
Sixth, on the clarity interpretation, it could refer to accurate, factual disclo-
sures about which there is no controversy concerning their misleadingness.21  
Finally, on the characterization interpretation, it could refer to disclosures that 
 
 15. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) 
(severing the “uncontroversial” requirement from the “factual” requirement). 
 16.  See, e.g., CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley (CTIA), 854 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 
2017) (“‘[U]ncontroversial’ in this context refers to the factual accuracy of the compelled disclosure, 
not it its subjective impact on the audience.”); Nat’l Ass’n of Wheat Growers v. Zeise, 309 F. Supp. 
3d 842, 851 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (“In this context, ‘uncontroversial’ ‘refers to the factual accuracy of the 
compelled disclosure, not to its subjective impact on the audience.’” (quoting CTIA, 854 F.3d at 
1117)). 
 17.  See, e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 18.  See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (seeming to interpret “uncontroversial topics” to mean infor-
mation about topics that are not the subject of controversy). 
 19. See, e.g., EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 428–29 (6th Cir. 
2019) (interpreting “uncontroversial” to mean that there is agreement about the information’s rele-
vance). 
 20. See, e.g., Serova v. Sony Music Entm’t, 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487, 501–02 (Ct. App. 2018) (un-
derstanding “uncontroversial information” to require the regulated party to agree with the facts). 
 21. See, e.g., Zeise, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 851 (invalidating a cancer warning on a herbicide because 
it found the warning misleading given readers’ background knowledge). 
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characterize particular non-normative facts in a contested way.22 
On all of these interpretations, the controversiality of the factual infor-
mation within a compelled disclosure should not serve as an independent fac-
tor that represents a First Amendment defect.23  On the descriptive interpreta-
tion, “uncontroversial information” amounts to a useful redundancy, not an 
independent factor.  With respect to the objective interpretation, free speech 
issues may arise surrounding disclosures that involve “subjective” criteria, but 
the issues pertain to notice and vagueness, not controversiality.24 
With respect to the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth interpretations (uncon-
troversial topics; relevance; uncontested facts; and clarity), although each can 
be discerned as implicitly operating in some lower court decisions, none of 
them captures a reasonable First Amendment interest that should ground an 
independent factor of First Amendment analysis. Worse, each of them, when 
construed as an independent factor, implicitly fuels an exceptionalist approach 
that is in tension with the rule of law.25 
Compelled disclosures of “controversial information” as it would be un-
derstood on the characterization interpretation may raise legitimate free 
speech concerns, although, in truth, the issues do not arise from the contro-
versiality of the information in such disclosures.  These concerns could be 
addressed through accommodations, without invalidating the disclosures.  
Such accommodation efforts could, however, prove administratively chal-
lenging.  As discussed in Part IV, an alternative resolution of the disputes over 
how factual information is categorized may require further consideration of 
issues raised by another compelled speech case, Johanns v. Livestock Market-
ing Ass’n,26 strangely off stage in NIFLA, concerning when government-man-
dated speech should be thought of as government speech.  Although these 
important First Amendment questions about mandating speakers to broadcast 
government speech deserve further exploration, they have very little to do 
with whether the content of the speech is controversial.27 
 
 22. See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. US Dept. of Agr., 760 F. 3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (acknowledging 
but bracketing plaintiff’s claim that a disclosure referring to ‘slaughter’ rather than ‘harvesting’ to 
refer to meat production would involve controversial information). 
 23. See infra Part III.C. 
 24. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 25. See infra Part III.C.7. 
 26. 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (upholding a compelled subsidy program for beef advertising by framing 
the advertising as government speech). 
 27. See infra Part IV.B. 
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Part V concludes.  We should return to a conservative interpretation of 
“purely factual and uncontroversial information,” one closer to the virtually 
redundant meaning of the standard announced in Zauderer.  That is, assuming 
compelled disclosures by institutions are purely factual, justified, and not un-
duly burdensome, they should be upheld against a First Amendment challenge 
so long as the required disclosures consist of documented, non-normative 
facts.  There is no need for a separate inquiry and judgment about whether the 
disclosures are controversial in some other sense.  Such inquiries encourage 
the untenable idea that there is a constitutional imperative that the government 
avoid taking controversial positions and that institutional disagreements over 
policy by themselves ground rationales for exemptions. 
To be sure, some delicate questions may arise about whether institutions 
may insist on putting disclosures in their own terms so long as they effectively 
convey the same content.  Answering those questions depends, in part, on re-
solving further issues about when governmentally scripted speech constitutes 
government speech and under what conditions institutions may resist display-
ing scripted speech.  What seems clear, though, is that the answers to such 
questions do not revolve around whether the speech contains “controversial 
information” in any meaningful sense.28 
II. COMPELLED SPEECH AND NONPROFIT SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS 
A. The NIFLA Decision 
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra concerned a 
First Amendment challenge to the Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive 
Care and Transparency Act (FACT).29  Under FACT, California required li-
censed pregnancy clinics to post disclosure30 notices offering information 
about publicly funded family planning services, including contraception and 
 
 28. See, e.g., Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-67 (discussing whether governmentally scripted speech 
constituted government speech without addressing whether the speech was controversial). 
 29. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368. 
 30. The sense of disclosure at issue in this line of cases and this Article is that of providing relevant 
information known by, at least, the state but about which a reader, such as a potential client, may be 
unaware.  It does not encompass the sense of compelled disclosure involving the required revelation 
of information over which the compelled speaker has special access, such as compelled disclosure to 
the IRS of one’s earnings. 
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abortion.31  It required unlicensed clinics also to disseminate notices clarifying 
that their services and some of their service providers were not licensed by the 
State of California.32  The aim of the compelled disclosures was to prevent 
deception of potential clients by informing them of their options, including 
the public availability of a broad range of services that extended beyond what 
so-called “pregnancy-crisis centers” offered and supported.33  A number of 
anti-abortion organizations that ran such clinics filed suit, alleging that these 
requirements violated their freedom of speech.  Largely, their complaints cen-
tered upon having to advertise services to which they objected.34 
In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, a 5-4 Court reversed a denial 
of a preliminary injunction against these disclosures, citing a number of First 
Amendment grounds.35  The Court reaffirmed the standard announced in Zau-
derer that the state may, with only deferential review, compel commercial 
speakers to make disclosures so long as they involve “purely factual and un-
controversial information” about their services and are not unjustified or un-
duly burdensome.36  Further, the state may regulate commerce or conduct in 
ways that incidentally burden speech, as exemplified by malpractice liability 
and informed consent requirements.37  However, the Court objected that def-
erential review was inappropriate in this case, for the disclosures were about 
state services and not the pregnancy-crisis centers’ services.38  In addition, 
they were not tied to any procedure and were offered to “clients, regardless of 
whether a medical procedure is ever sought, offered, or performed.”39  Further, 
the Court claimed that the notices were not uncontroversial because they 
(partly) concerned abortion, “anything but an ‘uncontroversial topic.’”40  The 
Court also complained that in the case of the licensed notices, the require-
ments were not well-tailored or integral to meeting the state’s educational 
 
 31. Id. at 2369 (explaining what FACT required). 
 32. Id. at 2370. 
 33. Id. at 2369 (explaining the purpose of FACT). 
 34. See Complaint at 2–3, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 2016 WL 3627327 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016), (No. 15CV2277 JAH DHB). 
 35. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2370 (2018) 
(stating the Court’s holding and discussing the First Amendment). 
 36. Id. at 2372; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642, 651 (1985). 
 37.  NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. 
 38. Id. at 2372. 
 39. Id. at 2373–74. 
 40. Id. at 2372. 
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interests.41  Finally, in the case of the unlicensed notices, the state interests 
were not well documented, and the state failed to show that the notices were 
“neither unjustified nor unduly burdensome.”42 
B. For Institutions and Market Agents, What Speech Values are Implicated 
by Compelled Disclosures? 
Many arguments in the opinion are contestable.  Justice Breyer, in a dis-
sent joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, placed his fingers 
squarely upon most of the weak spots.43  The dissent worries about the uncer-
tainty the case generates about health and safety warnings and product disclo-
sures.44  But, like the majority opinion, the dissent says little about how 
“purely factual and uncontroversial information” should be interpreted. 
To grapple with this question, we should identify what free speech values 
are at stake with compelled disclosures of this kind.  Cases of this profile raise 
different intrinsic issues than does the compelled speech of individuals.  Bar-
nette’s stance about a compelled, scripted recitation seems correct in large part 
because the dignity of individuals and their interest in freedom of thought pre-
cludes the state’s attempting to influence their (and others’) minds by recruit-
ing their own speech facility to do so.  By hijacking a person’s speech against 
her will, the state compels a person to mouth insincere affirmations, which 
puts her speech in tension with her moral integrity and independence.45  Fur-
ther, ritual affirmations may influence her thought in an insidious way—rather 
than directly, through persuasion, the compelled speech may bypass a per-
son’s rational deliberation and recruit instincts associated with virtues of 
 
 41. Id. at 2375–76. 
 42. Id. at 2377. 
 43. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2379–93 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
 44. Id. at 2376, 2381 (“The majority, for example, does not explain why the Act here, which is 
justified in part by health and safety considerations, does not fall within its ‘health’ category. . . .  Nor 
does the majority opinion offer any reasoned basis that might help apply its disclaimer for distinguish-
ing lawful from unlawful disclosures.”). 
 45. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633–34 (1943); Vincent Blasi & 
Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of 
Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 409, 438–39 (Michael C. 
Dorf ed., 2004).  Of course, some hijacked speakers may endorse the speech’s content, but not its 
wording, the timing of the expression, how it is situated in the social context, how it may be taken in 
context as well as its larger meaning, and what its articulation suggests about its importance and ap-
propriate expression.  Id. at 436.  Affirmations that are involuntary for any of these reasons fall under 
the term “insincere affirmations.”  
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sincerity and familiarity, to identify and absorb what one says.46  Finally, by 
using the person as a vehicle to transmit the state’s message, the state treats a 
person as a mere means for transmitting the state’s message, rather than as an 
independently-minded thinker and speaker, thereby marking another conflict 
with the due respect owed to a person with dignity.47 
These arguments do not transfer neatly to contexts in which the speech is 
not ritually repeated.  More important, they do not have the same resonance 
when it is not the speech of an individual that is compelled, but rather the 
speech of an institution or organization to which the term “dignity” does not 
well apply, and that does not have the same mental mechanisms and vulnera-
bilities, nor the identity and moral character, of a moral agent.  Thus, it may 
be understandable that the complaints of commercial organizations against 
compelled disclosures meant to protect their customers compel much less 
sympathy than the claims of school children anxious to comply with religious 
mandates that they not worship false idols. 
However, the litigants in NIFLA, as nonprofit organizations, occupy in-
termediate ground between commercial, for-profit organizations and individ-
uals operating outside of the market.  On the one hand, their mission is one of 
conscience—their moral and religious opposition to abortion underwrites 
their offers of support and alternatives to abortion for unwanted pregnancies.48  
There is little risk that posting these notices will fray their commitments, but 
because these compelled disclosures are not part of a regular ritual socially 
recognized as such, there might be a risk that the notices could be misunder-
stood as reflecting the sentiments or endorsements of the organization.  So, 
there is the risk that their compelled posting could garble the organization’s 
message—a message clearly protected by the First Amendment.49  Further, 
 
 46. Id. at 434, 437–38; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Associa-
tion?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 854 (2005) (“Routine recitation [of the Pledge of Allegiance] may make 
its message familiar.  Through regularity, it may become a comfort and an internal source of authority 
for consultation.  At a later point, one might instinctively, without further thought and without aware-
ness of the origin of thought, characterize the polity as a republic, or as a place where there is freedom 
and justice, or perhaps more plausibly, be more likely assent to another’s assertion to that effect.”). 
 47. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715, 717 (1997) (citing an individual’s right to not 
serve as a “courier” for or an “instrument” for promoting the state’s message); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 641, 645 (2001) (argu-
ing that the right not to be commandeered to convey the state’s message is a potent protection against 
state intrusion upon one’s autonomy). 
 48. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368. 
 49. Id. at 2378. 
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given that their mission is one of conscience, an enactment of collective moral 
commitment, their instrumental treatment by the state may provoke greater 
concern than would appropriately be extended to a purely commercial enter-
prise, whose dominant structure expresses an instrumental attitude toward its 
activities—that is, its activities are means to the animating end of generating 
profits.50  Sensitivity to the concern over opportunistic use by the state and the 
instrumental treatment offers some motivation for the requirement that the 
compelled speech must serve an appropriate state interest in a non-arbitrary 
way.51  Zauderer only required that the state interest be reasonable, but that 
case concerned purely commercial activity.52  For a nonprofit, given its ex-
pressive purposes, there may be reason to demand that the state interest be 
important—a standard that would have been met in NIFLA because the state 
was attempting to avoid deception and to ensure the informed consent of po-
tential patients—and that the compelled speech regulation serves that interest 
in a non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory way.53 
Although the nonprofit, mission-based nature of an enterprise may be rel-
evant to First Amendment interests, on the other hand, nonprofit organizations 
like NIFLA are not merely speech-based associations attempting to form or 
express their members’ views, or to persuade the public of the merits of their 
cause.  Rather, they offer medical services and advice, and they advertise for 
clients.  As with other goods and services offered in the market, whether for 
profit or not, the state has an interest in ensuring the healthiness and safety of 
the services offered and that potential clients, consumers, and patients have 
sufficient, accurate information to offer informed consent to their purchase 
and/or their use. 
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion took the speech interests at stake ra-
ther more seriously than was warranted.  His opinion is a little puzzling.  In 
particular, his impassioned defense of freedom of professional speech54 is 
 
 50. See, e.g., Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 45, at 437 n.123. 
 51. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375–76. 
 52. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 53. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2385–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 2374–75 (arguing that professional speech is vulnerable to content-based regulations that 
pose the risk of suppressing minority opinions).  Although Justice Thomas’ discussion of whether 
“professional speech” is a distinctive category deserving lesser First Amendment protection was partly 
provoked by the lower court’s approach, the issue was a red herring, both in the instant case and more 
generally.  See id. at 2371–72.  After all, part of the thrust of the California regulation was to require 
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bizarre when coupled with his effort to distinguish this case from Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.55  Casey reaffirmed the 
core right to abortion from Roe, but it also upheld substantial burdens on that 
right, including a regulation that physicians recite a cavalcade of information 
to patients about fetal development, adoption alternatives, and state services 
supporting childcare and adoption to their patients seeking abortion, before 
forcing patients into a medically unnecessary day of delay in the name of con-
templation before proceeding with treatment.56 
Justice Thomas defended this face-to-face state-mandated bullying as a 
form of “informed consent” that met First Amendment requirements.57  Yet, 
he contended that the regulation in NIFLA failed to meet the standard that the 
First Amendment demands that the compelled disclosure be limited to “purely 
factual and uncontroversial” information.58  Justice Breyer reasonably in-
quired how the speech in Casey was part of the informed consent process but 
not the speech at issue in NIFLA—speech that also informed potential clients 
of the clinic of other available, free services and made explicit that practition-
ers in some clinics were not licensed professionals.59  Indeed, one might ask 
why other seemingly pertinent cases went unmentioned, namely: Rust v. 
 
disclosure when these service providers were not in fact health professionals.  Id. at 2370.  Further, 
the regulation did not target professionals as such but rather sites of service provision.  Id.  More 
generally, the idea that “professional speech” as such is a distinctive First Amendment category seems 
an unhelpful conception of the issue, perpetuated by Justice Thomas’ refutation, although not his in-
vention.  The category of “professionals” is rather capacious—ranging from racecar drivers and bas-
ketball players, to hedge fund managers and venture capitalists, and to doctors and lawyers.  Some 
have specialized knowledge and offer specialized services to the public and others do not.  What seems 
more relevant is that these organizations, on the one hand, were engaged in market activity, and on the 
other, that their expression was not dominantly commercial.  Professional speech cuts across both 
domains.  To be sure, the distinction between commercial enterprises and nonprofit enterprises is 
overly blunt.  Some commercial enterprises are explicitly dedicated to articulating messages and serv-
ing causes, including but not limited to, B-corporations. 
 55. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 56. Id. at 846, 882–83, 886.  Since Casey, compelled disclosure requirements in the abortion con-
text have been extended in cases like EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 423–25 
(6th Cir. 2019) (upholding a requirement that forces doctors to perform unwanted, invasive, and med-
ically unnecessary ultrasounds and to provide commentary on the ultrasound to the pregnant patient). 
 57. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. 
 58. Id. at 2372. 
 59. Id. at 2385–86; see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional Gerryman-
dering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 61, 111 (2019) (discussing the 
partisan nature of the tension).  
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Sullivan,60 another case limiting federally funded ob-gyns (professionals!) 
from speaking candidly to patients about their options; and, Johanns v. Live-
stock Marketing,61 a case that avoided a First Amendment challenge to a com-
pelled subsidy case by noting that the funded speech was government speech, 
which is arguably true in this case as well.62 
Justice Thomas did not bother to reply to Justice Breyer’s question about 
Casey.63  One worries that the majority’s answer is that in-person bullying on 
the brink of a procedure counts as informed consent, but not a more subtle 
notification to potential clients.64  One might have thought the distinction goes 
the other way. So, it is unfortunate that Justice Breyer intimated that the two 
go hand in hand; for my money, that aspect of Casey was wrong the day it 
was decided.  Unlike the Casey speech, the NIFLA speech does not bully and 
it does not condescend.  Most important, perhaps, the NIFLA speech does not 
require a doctor advising a patient to garble her message of support and prep-
aration for one procedure by inserting judgment and advocacy of an alterna-
tive in the middle of it.  The NIFLA speech only asks an organization to post 
information that need not come out of the mouth of a particular person iden-
tified as a trusted caregiver whose success partly depends upon the patient’s 
subscription to that identity. 
Justice Breyer’s mystification about the inconsistency with Casey makes 
him worry aloud that a long list of mandated commercial and service disclo-
sures are now at risk—including requirements that doctors provide parents 
with information about seat belts, that buildings post maps with staircase 
 
 60. 500 U.S. 173, 179–80 (1991). 
 61. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
 62. Id. at 562–67. 
 63. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“If a State can lawfully require a doctor to 
tell a woman seeking an abortion about adoption services, why should it not be able, as here, to require 
a medical counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal care or other reproductive healthcare about child-
birth and abortion services?”). 
 64. The suggestion that it matters that the NIFLA disclosure was directed at potential clients and 
not patients about to undergo a medical procedure is absurd.  See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373–74.  
Informed consent is supposed to be a prerequisite to becoming a patient who undergoes a procedure 
or receives other sorts of care.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881–87 
(1992).  If one may decline based on that information, then the information will often go to people 
who are not yet patients.  Further, it is notable that in Zauderer, the Court upheld the permissibility of 
a compelled disclosure in an advertisement, one meant to solicit clients and not just to inform actual 
clients.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629–31 (1985). 
[Vol. 47: 731, 2020] Compelled Speech 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
746 
locations, and that landlords tell tenants when the trash-collector calls.65  Jus-
tice Breyer is correct to worry that the disparate classification is hard to jus-
tify.66   
Justice Thomas seems to interpret the standard that mandatory disclosures 
must consist of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” as a true con-
junctive, rather than as something like a pleonastic legal doublet like “aid and 
abet” or “null and void.”  For Justice Thomas, it appears that the “and uncon-
troversial information” does not simply underscore that the compelled disclo-
sure must be factual and not an opinion, although there is reason to believe 
that is what the original phrase from Zauderer meant.67  Justice Thomas intro-
duces a new standard that the material must be purely factual and the purely 
factual material must be uncontroversial.68  Since the provision of state-sup-
ported abortion and contraceptive services is controversial—but not the truth 
of the claim that they are provided—Justice Thomas balks at their compelled 
disclosure.  But, assuming he did not regard seat belt safety or timely egress 
controversial practices, he would have no reason to object to compelled state-
ments about seat belt laws and staircase locations.69  To be sure, Justice 
Thomas’s quick treatment offers a way to distinguish the forms of govern-
ment-mandated speech that Breyer thinks NIFLA now puts at risk, but it raises 
 
 65.  NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2380–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also The Supreme Court, 2017 
Term—Leading Cases, 132 HARV. L. REV. 347, 351 (2018) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (“Taken as 
written, NIFLA represents a dramatic expansion of the scope of First Amendment protection for com-
mercial speech that threatens the entire foundation of a broad range of consumer protections.”).  These 
concerns are not entirely hypothetical.  Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749, 753 
(9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (reversing denial of a preliminary injunction against compelled disclosure of 
health risks associated with sugary beverages); CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 138 S. 
Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.) (remanding a case involving compelled disclosure about exposure to radio 
waves from cell phone use for reconsideration in light of NIFLA), aff’d, 928 F.3d 832, 845 (9th Cir. 
2019) (holding a compelled disclosure is only controversial when it forces a party to take sides in a 
“heated political controversy”). 
 66. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2385; Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 59, at 108–09. 
 67. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; see also Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 
674 F. 3d 509, 569 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding tobacco warning requirement and stating “whether a 
disclosure is scrutinized under Zauderer turns on whether the disclosure conveys factual information 
or an opinion, not on whether the disclosure emotionally affects its audience or incites controversy”); 
Lauren Fowler, The “Uncontroversial” Controversy in Compelled Commercial Disclosures, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1651, 1674–79 (2019) (discussing other cases that treated the test as centered on 
whether the speech is factual). 
 68. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 69. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372–74, 2376 (noting that the Court does “not question the legality 
of health and safety warnings long considered permissible”). 
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other substantial issues. 
III. SEVEN DISTINCT INTERPRETATIONS 
A. From Zauderer to NIFLA 
Although the conjunctive reading may rescue Justice Thomas’s approach 
from the particular parade of horribles imagined by Justice Breyer, that read-
ing does not flow straight from Zauderer.  The Zauderer protection that the 
state cannot expect speakers to make compelled disclosures unless those com-
pelled disclosures consist of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” 
should be understood in light of the context that inspired its articulation.70  
Unlike the case at issue in NIFLA, Zauderer did not address government-
scripted disclosures that would give important context to the speaker’s state-
ment. 
Rather, Zauderer concerned attorney-written advertisements and the non-
scripted disclosures that speakers might be expected to generate to accompany 
or clarify their advertisements so as to avoid consumer deception; for exam-
ple, advertisements that no legal fees would be charged in an unsuccessful 
representation would have to explain that court costs were not included within 
“legal fees.”71  In that context, the “purely factual and uncontroversial” re-
quirement seems best understood as a protection of speakers from overly de-
manding expectations that they be creative and entrepreneurial in discovering 
and identifying facts that must then be disclosed.  Rather, the expectation is 
that what they disclose be “purely factual and uncontroversial information” in 
the sense of information that is “well-known or understood” as opposed to its 
being secret, obscure, esoteric, or a merely speculative, untested hypothesis.  
So, if part of the concern animating Zauderer is grounded in what speech a 
regulated entity may be expected to generate or produce on their own, that 
concern is not apposite where the compelled speech is scripted, for, in that 
case, the government would do the work to uncover the information. 
Putting production costs aside, and assuming arguendo that the standard 
associated with scripted speech should be the same as for speaker-generated 
 
 70. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding that a layperson 
would not understand the difference between “legal fees” and “costs” which could lead that person to 
believe that using the appellant’s legal services would be free of charge even in the event of a losing 
case). 
 71. Id. at 652–53. 
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speech, the important point is that the standard is not concerned with what the 
information is about but rather that it is information, not opinion.  It has noth-
ing to do with whether the information itself concerns a controversial matter 
or whether some contest the validity of the information.  Hence, there is reason 
to think the standard in Zauderer meant something more modest by “uncon-
troversial information,” something that would underscore “purely factual.” 
But, the facts in NIFLA differed in two significant ways from those pre-
sented in Zauderer.  Perhaps those differences raise distinct First Amendment 
concerns that motivate the conjunctive and far more substantive reading of 
“uncontroversial.”  First, as previously noted, Zauderer directly concerned 
expectations that a speaker generate disclosures of her own to prevent con-
sumer deception, rather than expectations that a speaker post disclosures gen-
erated by the state.  Second, Zauderer concerned a commercial entity that was 
not associated with any particular cause, whereas NIFLA concerned a non-
profit service entity dedicated to a cause.72 
In one respect, as just argued, the difference between compelling the gen-
eration of speech and compelling the posting of scripted speech cuts against 
any more expansive, conjunctive reading of “purely factual and uncontrover-
sial information.”  When the compelled speech is provided, there is no opera-
tive concern that the state is unreasonably demanding that a speaker discover 
certain facts or have certain thoughts.  But, one might have separate concerns 
about imposing state-drafted speech on an entity whose partial purpose is to 
express or advance a cause.  When the speech is written by the government, 
one may be tempted to think that to avoid interfering with the mission-based 
entity’s expression, the compelled speech should both be purely factual and 
also uncontroversial. 
Despite the allure of the impulse to interpret “purely factual and uncon-
troversial information” as though it posited two distinct criteria for permissi-
ble disclosure requirements, that impulse should be resisted.  This two-criteria 
interpretation represents a wrong-headed way to think about compelled 
speech for mission-driven nonprofit service providers, one that is not respon-
sive to the underlying rationale for regulating service providers.  It should be 
sufficient to uphold the regulations that the compelled speech is factual (in the 
 
 72. Compare id. (concerning an attorney advertising for legal representation), with Nat’l Inst. of 
Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018) (concerning crisis preg-
nancy centers which are “pro-life (largely Christian belief-based) organizations that offer a limited 
range of free pregnancy options, counseling, and other services to individuals that visit a center”). 
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sense of not being a normative claim), that the compelled speech substantially 
furthers an appropriate governmental objective in a way that is reasonably 
connected to the conditions of service provision, and that its articulation 
would not interfere with the organization’s ability to voice its message and for 
clients to receive it. 
As I remarked earlier, mission-driven nonprofit service providers repre-
sent an interesting case because they have one foot in the market, broadly 
speaking, and another foot in the public forum of ideas.  By saying they have 
a foot in the market, I do not mean that they charge money or seek profits.  I 
mean that they are in the business of providing goods or services to people.  
Although what people think and what people say in the public forum of ideas 
and in private contexts must be subject to the strongest free speech protec-
tions, the acts involved in service provision are exactly the sort of thing the 
government may reasonably regulate.  We cannot all be expected to be experts 
about every type of good and service, including how they are produced, in 
what market environment, who is qualified to render them, and what alterna-
tives the market offers.  To facilitate a safe environment of complex service 
provision, epistemic divisions of labor are essential so that individuals may 
safely buy and use services without having to invest in undue, infeasible 
amounts of research; freeing them from such research is not only socially ef-
ficient but enables intellectual freedom by permitting individuals to pursue 
their chosen goals and specific intellectual interests, rather than focusing their 
intellectual efforts to protect basic needs and vulnerabilities.73  They need to 
be able to trust that service provision is expert and safe, and that service pro-
viders represent what they do and their limits accurately. (Similar things may 
be said about the provision of goods). 
Note that this is an information-centered, epistemic argument.74  As such, 
 
 73. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 645 (1985) (“[D]istin-
guishing deceptive from nondeceptive advertising in virtually any field of commerce may require res-
olution of exceedingly complex and technical factual issues and the consideration of nice questions of 
semantics.”). 
 74. This distinguishes it from the arguments about compelled commercial speech subsidies, which 
were justified on economic grounds of promoting a product.  See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & 
Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 474–75 (1997) (holding that generic advertising funded by compelled sub-
sidies has a legitimate purpose of stimulating consumer demand for an agricultural product in a regu-
lated market and that it is consistent with the regulatory goals of the overall statutory scheme); Johanns 
v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562–63 (2005).  But see United States v. United Foods, Inc., 
533 U.S. 405, 412 (2001) (holding that the commercial purpose of compelled subsidies does not 
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it shouldn’t surprise anyone that some forms of governmental regulation will 
take the form of requiring communication and requiring service providers 
who may be expected to be centers of information about their services to pro-
vide accurate and useful information about those services, their providers, and 
the conditions of their provision. 
The facts that a service provider also has a mission and does not seek 
profit do not detract from this argument.  Neither fact bears on the central core 
of the epistemic argument.  At the margins, there may be some differences 
that might influence the form of regulation.  The profit motive may, some-
times, give one heightened reason to second-guess the representations made 
by a profit-seeker, given potential trade-offs between providing high-quality 
services and high-quality information about them and maximizing profits.  
Whereas the mission-driven nonprofit service provider provides the service as 
part of its mission, so ensuring the quality of the service dovetails with its 
mission.  On the other hand, because nonprofits often provide services for a 
discounted rate or for free, some of the quality control offered by competition 
may be sacrificed.  Further, the quality of the service will track the aim of the 
mission and may not necessarily, as in the case of NIFLA, track the aims of 
clients whose aims and needs may differ.  Given their mission to discourage 
abortion and contraception, “pregnancy crisis” centers may offer good advice 
about adoption services and child care but may not comprehensively serve 
patients looking for the full range of advice and options about the crisis of 
their pregnancy. 
Given that the epistemic argument squarely applies to mission-based ser-
vice providers, why does this feel like a difficult case at all?  Why not say to 
voluntary expressive associations that they enjoy perfect freedom to speak and 
to resist all compelled speech requirements (but perhaps for some disclaimers 
informing members of their protected rights of exit), but that if they begin to 
provide goods or services, those aspects of their activities are subject to what-
ever reasonable regulations govern commercial providers? 
In essence, I think this is the correct position.  There are reasons to be 
especially careful in this domain, though.  The service provision is not speech, 
but it is an expressive outgrowth of the mission and, further, as a general mat-
ter, we may want to encourage and protect morally motivated market activity 
 
deprive all First Amendment protection especially where the subsidies do not fall within a broader 
comprehensive regulatory scheme). 
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as an alternative to purely profit-based market activity.75  So we may have 
special reasons to be sensitive to the organization’s interest in ensuring that 
its message may be clearly articulated, given the organization’s ability to cul-
tivate and disseminate its message is closely tied to the identity and motiva-
tions of the members and its ability to inspire members and express their com-
mitments. 
Such sensitivity would not, however, bring us to Justice Thomas’ posi-
tion.  Those regulations will already be subject to limitations based on the 
scope of the epistemic argument just provided, one that inherently is oriented 
toward regulation and disclosure of the sorts of facts discoverable through 
empirical and legal research.  That argument offers no justification for the 
government to require services to articulate normative messages—messages 
that both run a special danger of garbling the message of a mission-based or-
ganization and of hazarding free speech violations through the appearance of 
government efforts to impose an orthodoxy.  So, it makes sense to articulate 
the standard that compelled speech is to be limited to compelled factual 
speech. 
B. Further Interpretations of “Uncontroversial Information” 
But what about non-normative factual speech that is controversial?  Might 
not compelling organizations to articulate and distribute it garble their mes-
sage or, if not their message, their voice?  The immediate difficulty is that, as 
lower court struggles attest,76 it isn’t at all clear what is meant by the require-
ment that the disclosures be limited to “uncontroversial information.”  We can 
distinguish at least seven interpretations. 
First, on what we might call the descriptive interpretation, it could under-
score and reinforce the “purely factual” requirement.77  That is, it may just 
indicate truthful information that is descriptive and factual in the sense of be-
ing non-normative and not a mere speculative hypothesis.  I have suggested 
that this is the best reading of the Zauderer requirement.78  Despite its consti-
tutional modesty, though, it cannot be what Justice Thomas had in mind since 
 
 75. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, and Market Dynamics, 41 
LOY. L. REV. 317, 325–26 (2007) (discussing morally motivated activity by market agents). 
 76. See supra note 10. 
 77. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 78. See supra Part III.A. 
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the information at issue in NIFLA met these criteria.79 
Second, on the objective interpretation, “uncontroversial information” 
could refer to non-normative facts susceptible to classification using objective 
criteria, whereas non-normative facts whose classification criteria are “sub-
jective” would count as “controversial information.”80  This interpretation was 
advanced in Entertainment Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich,81 a case involving 
a challenge to a requirement that video games with “sexually explicit” content 
be labeled as such.  The court found the requirement was an unconstitutional 
compelled disclosure of a controversial message because whether a game 
should be classified as “sexually explicit” involves a “subjective and highly 
controversial” opinion with which others may disagree.82 
Third, on the uncontroversial topics interpretation, “uncontroversial in-
formation” could refer to truthful information about matters that are not the 
subject of controversy.83  On this view, regulations requiring the articulation 
of uncontested, established facts that concern controversial matters would run 
afoul of the standard.  The facts in NIFLA supply the salient example,84 pre-
figured by similar facts in Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York.85  A concur-
rence in American Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco echoed 
this idea, suggesting that a health warning about sugary beverages failed the 
 
 79. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2388 (2018) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Abortion is a controversial topic and a source of normative debate, but the 
availability of state resources is not a normative statement or a fact of debatable truth.  The disclosure 
includes information about resources available should a woman seek to continue her pregnancy or 
terminate it, and it expresses no official preference for one choice over the other.”). 
 80. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 81. 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 82. Id. at 652 (decrying the subjectivity of the criteria for “sexually explicit” as rendering the cat-
egorization controversial). 
 83. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 84. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018) 
(citation omitted) (“The [FACT Act] requires clinics that primarily serve pregnant women to provide 
certain notices.  Licensed clinics must notify women that California provides free or low-cost services, 
including abortions, and give them a phone number to call.  Unlicensed clinics must notify women 
that California has not licensed the clinics to provide medical services.”). 
 85. 740 F.3d 233, 245 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining in dicta that Zauderer’s rational basis review 
of compelled commercial speech does not apply to a state requirement that “crisis pregnancy” centers 
disclose the existence of alternative family planning resources and their services, which include abor-
tion, because the topic is politically controversial). 
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standard because it concerned a “controversial topic.”86 
Fourth, on the relevance interpretation, “uncontroversial information” 
could refer to non-normative facts, whose relevance with respect to the in-
tended audience’s decisions is not contested or controversial.87  On this inter-
pretation, a potential constitutional violation would arise when compelled dis-
closure regulations required articulation of a fact, the truth of which is 
uncontested, but the relevance of which is contested.  For example, one might 
consider the objections of organic farmers to the FDA’s “recommended” dis-
claimer on milk that is labeled as produced from rbST-free cows that “[n]o 
significant difference has been shown between milk derived from rbST-
treated and non-rbST-treated cows.”88  Some organic farmers think the dis-
claimer draws attention to an irrelevant fact because many of their objections 
to rbST have to do with the effects of the hormone on the cow, not on con-
sumers.89 
Fifth, on the uncontested interpretation, “uncontroversial information” 
could refer to non-normative facts, the truth of which is not a matter of con-
troversy.90  Some compelled disclosure regulations are controversial because 
the truth of the (purported) fact remains contested by the regulated party, even 
though that fact has been established through evidence that meets relevant 
burdens.  Think vaccine safety or, back in the day, tobacco toxicity.91  Or, to 
return to the rbST example, while some farmers believe the issue with rbST 
 
 86.  916 F.3d 749, 761 (9th Cir. 2019) (Ikuta, J., concurring) (noting that “uncontroversial” went 
undefined in NIFLA but arguing that because a health warning about sugary beverages involves a 
“controversial topic,” it fails NIFLA’s test) 
 87. See infra Part III.C.4. 
 88. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 634 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Interim Guidance 
on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products From Cows That Have Not Been Treated With 
Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279, 6279–80 (Feb. 10, 1994) (recommending in-
formational disclosures denying that milk from treated cows differs qualitatively from milk from un-
treated cows). 
 89. See also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(opining in dicta that an SEC requirement that companies disclose whether their minerals were “DCR 
conflict free” would not satisfy the ‘uncontroversial’ requirement because the phrase “conveys moral 
responsibility for the Congo War” and the company may “disagree with that assessment of its moral 
responsibility” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. V. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C. Cir. 
2014))).  But see Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 870–71 (2014) 
(noting that the relevant regulation did not require that specific language to be used at all). 
 90. See infra Part III.C.5. 
 91. See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, How Anti-Vaccine Sentiment Took Hold in the United States, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/health/anti-vaccination-movement-
us.html. 
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is its effect on cows, other farmers object to the disclaimer that there is no 
significant difference between milk derived from rbST-treated and non-rbST-
treated cows because they believe it is untrue.92  (So, the rbST case serves as 
an exemplar of potential violations of both the relevance and the uncontested 
interpretations.)  Such cases may seem more pressing when the regulated or-
ganization’s cause is intimately connected with the contestation of the pur-
ported facts, but it has been successfully invoked in circumstances where the 
speaker did not have any moral cause.  In a recent commercial speech case, 
this interpretation propelled a California court to reason that the compelled 
disclosure of a dispute over the identity of the singer on a number of tracks 
on a posthumous Michael Jackson album does not survive the “purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial” analysis because it would require the marketer 
to present factual information with which it disagreed.93 
Sixth, on the clarity interpretation, “uncontroversial” is interpreted to 
mean “not misleading.”94  Two concerns fall under the umbrella of this inter-
pretation of “controversial.”  First, some courts have worried that literally true 
statements may be misunderstood by consumers who lack the technical infor-
mation necessary to interpret them appropriately.  For example, in National 
Ass’n of Wheat Growers v. Zeise,95 a federal court invalidated a required warn-
ing about a herbicide that it was “known to cause cancer” because it found 
that claim misleading and therefore controversial on the grounds that many 
consumers would lack the background necessary to know that this warning 
could be based on single, unconfirmed findings.96  Second, courts have found 
compelled disclosures “controversial-because-misleading” when those warn-
ings were not precisely tailored. For example, in 2019, a federal magistrate 
judge found “controversial” a requirement that unreinforced masonry build-
ings post seismic safety warnings about unreinforced masonry because its pur-
ported over-inclusivity and under-inclusivity was misleading.97  Some regu-
lated buildings had to post the notice even if they had undergone some 
 
 92. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 622 F.3d at 636–37. 
 93. See, e.g., Serova v. Sony Music Entm’t, 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487, 501–502 (App. Ct. 2018) (“By 
compelling disclosure of the controversy over the Disputed Tracks to avoid liability, the UCL and 
CLRA would, in effect, require Appellants to present views in their marketing materials with which 
they do not agree.”). 
 94. See infra Part III.C.6. 
 95. 309 F. Supp. 3d 842, 851 (E.D. Cal. 2018). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1302 (D. Or. 2019). 
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retrofitting.  Yet, other sorts of buildings may also pose seismic hazards, but 
were not subject to the requirement.  Thus, “singl[ing] out URM buildings for 
compelled disclosures” rendered the regulation “misleading, controversial, 
and inflammatory.”98 
Finally, on the characterization interpretation, “uncontroversial infor-
mation” could refer to disclosures whose characterization of particular non-
normative facts is uncontested.99  The offending examples would then be reg-
ulations that require the articulation of facts framed, characterized, or catego-
rized in a controversial way.  Examples may include: when animal slaughter 
is called “slaughter” rather than the meat industry’s preferred euphemism of 
“harvesting”;100 when the government tried to require graphic labels on ciga-
rettes depicting the consequences of smoking and tobacco companies com-
plained that graphic depictions were designed to elicit emotional, rather than 
purely cognitive responses;101 and, when the government labels an IUD as 
“birth control,” but some groups regard it not as contraception, but as an abor-
tifacient.102 
It’s a strain to think of these cases as cases of controversial information.  
The information itself is not controversial.  One might think of it as infor-
mation, controversially described.  So, “uncontroversial information” might 
be understood as factual information, uncontroversially described. 
C. “Controversial” Information & First Amendment Concerns 
Does compelled disclosure of “controversial information” raise any dis-
tinctive First Amendment concerns on any or all of the disparate interpreta-
tions just identified?  No.   
 
 98. Id. at 1303.  
 99. See infra Part III.C.8. 
 100. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“As to whether it is 
‘controversial,’ AMI objected to the word ‘slaughter’ in its reply brief.  Though it seems a plain, blunt 
word for a plain, blunt action, we can understand a claim that ‘slaughter,’ used on a product of any 
origin, might convey a certain innuendo.”). 
 101. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Nat’l 
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (suggesting in dicta that 
the phrase “DRC conflict-free” if required in an SEC disclosure would not be “uncontroversial” be-
cause the companies objected to its implicature of responsibility). 
 102. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 691, 761 (2014) (considering 
Hobby Lobby’s objection to providing funding for four contraceptive methods, including IUDs, which 
it characterized as abortifacients). 
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As argued in more detail below, the descriptive interpretation understands 
“uncontroversial” as a useful redundancy that gives “uncontroversial infor-
mation” no independent force.103  Cases that fall afoul of the second objective 
category should be analyzed in terms of vagueness and notice, not controver-
siality.104 
 The third through sixth interpretations also do not raise any serious inde-
pendent First Amendment concerns that merit constitutional protection.105  
The effort to read them as doing so is both confused and in tension with the 
rule of law.  With respect to the seventh interpretation concerning controver-
sial characterizations, these do not really involve controversial infor-
mation.106  Nonetheless, controversial characterizations may raise some dif-
ferent First Amendment questions that have been lurking since Johanns.107  
These questions are worth attention, but have nothing to do with the contro-
versiality of the information within the disclosures. 
1. The Descriptive Interpretation 
That “controversial information” poses no distinctive First Amendment 
issues is obvious in the case of the descriptive interpretation.  This interpreta-
tion reads “uncontroversial information” as merely reinforcing and clarifying 
the “purely factual” prong, as in other doublets like “aid and abet,” “null and 
void,” and “terms and conditions.”  So, if the disclosure satisfies the “purely 
factual” requirement, it follows perforce that it involves uncontroversial in-
formation (and vice versa). 
Although this seems like the most sensible reading of Zauderer, as argued 
above, it is also plain that it cannot be squared with the outcome in NIFLA.  
After all, the information about alternative care providers was purely factual, 
accurate, and nothing like a mere speculative hypothesis.  Although the 
NIFLA Court did not specify what it meant by “uncontroversial” and how ex-
actly the disclosure failed this test, the Court was implicitly relying on another 
interpretation.108  While the only one that makes much sense of the outcome 
is the (implausible) uncontroversial topics interpretation, lower courts are not 
 
 103. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 104. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 105. See infra Parts III.C.3–7. 
 106. See infra Part III.C.8. 
 107. See supra Part III.A. 
 108. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2369. 
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hewing to that interpretation, but are explicitly and implicitly pursuing differ-
ent understandings of what “uncontroversial” represents. 
2. The Objective Interpretation 
There may be more independent substance to the First Amendment com-
plaints associated with the objective interpretation, in cases in which the cri-
teria for identifying when a disclosure is apt is “subjective” and, therefore, 
subject to disagreement.  In the lower court case that advanced this interpre-
tation concerning a compelled disclosure that a video was “sexually explicit,” 
the complaint was not that the disclosure was opinion-based in the sense of 
being ideological or that it advanced a speculative hypothesis.109  Although 
there was a dispute about whether the classification of the video game as sex-
ually explicit was accurate, that dispute traced back to a complaint about the 
criteria for classification being insufficiently determinate, thus provoking dis-
agreement.110  Although being sexually explicit is a non-normative property, 
one may imagine that what is regarded as sexually explicit may vary accord-
ing to the habits, customs, conventions, and beliefs of different cultural sub-
groups and cultures at different times.  Without more guidance, assessments 
of the category’s contours may partly reflect the classifier’s attitudes about 
gender relations and about what level of bodily exposure is sexually exciting 
or provocative.  This “eye of the beholder” variance may make compliance 
difficult. 
This seems like a relevant complaint, but it falls more in the category of 
inadequate notice or void for vagueness, which other doctrines address.111  
The issue is not really that the category or the criteria provoke 
 
 109. See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2006) (decrying 
the subjectivity of the criteria for ‘sexually explicit’ as rendering the categorization “controversial”). 
 110. Id. at 652. 
 111. Consider Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573–74 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held 
that a statute prohibiting public contemptuous treatment of the American flag was void for vagueness 
because it failed to draw the line between permissible and criminal nonceremonial treatment of the 
flag.  The Court specifically relied on the issue of notice that accompanies such a statute in which the 
determination of what is contemptuous treatment may vary from person to person.  Id. at 574; see also 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 806–07 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring) (striking down 
a statute restricting the sale or rental of violent video games to minors in part because the law’s defi-
nition of “violent video game” was impermissibly vague); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872–73 
(1997) (striking down the Communications Decency Act and holding that the act’s “indecent” and 
“patently offensive” standards were unconstitutionally vague). 
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disagreement.112  The problem is that it is unclear when the requirement ap-
plies, and unclear criteria leave speech requirements open to the vagaries of 
individual government officials.  That problem may exist even when everyone 
agrees about most of the classifications and when the gray areas merely pro-
voke uncertainty, not disagreement or controversy.  Further, clearer criteria 
(e.g., “sexually explicit” refers to direct, graphic depictions of sexual acts and 
unclothed genitals) may be thought less subjective but nevertheless provoke 
disagreement about the relevance of such classified facts, given such criteria.  
These arguments suggest that the invocation of this interpretation of “contro-
versial information” may sometimes be a stand-in for the relevance interpre-
tation, discussed below.113 
3. Controversial Topics 
NIFLA seems to fall into the controversial topics category: the crisis cen-
ters objected to the fact that state-provided abortion services were available, 
but they didn’t contest the truth of the fact that they were available.  Once it 
is explicitly isolated and articulated, it’s hard to see how this feature could be 
reasonably thought to raise a difficult First Amendment issue.  A mission-
based organization may find certain facts objectionable, such as the fact that 
state abortion services are available.  Even nonprofit employers may object to 
the minimum wage or the right to unionize.  They may resent having to artic-
ulate these facts as a condition on providing goods or services or employing 
people to enable that provision.  But, if they are facts that the government 
reasonably determines should be provided to consumers (or workers) in this 
context for purposes of safety or informed decision making, it just doesn’t 
seem relevant that what is accurately reported is controversial in the sense of 
its being subject to criticism.  And, controversial to whom?  The regulated 
party?  The society at large?  Could a regulated entity render a governmental 
disclosure regulation unconstitutional on free speech grounds by generating a 
controversy about the desirability of an established fact?  If such manufac-
tured controversy can comprise a method of invalidating regulation, then Jus-
tice Breyer’s worry that requirements that doctors tell parents about the 
 
 112. Indeed, many judgments labeled ‘subjective’ are those prototypically exempt from disagree-
ment.  I find honey disagreeably pungent and unctuous; you find it delicious.  We differ but we do not 
disagree.  When the tongue leaves the cheek, neither of us reasonably thinks the other is making an 
error. 
 113. See infra Part III.C.4. 
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availability of vaccines could be at risk becomes more serious.114 
Take another example: Lawyers are required to be licensed and may be 
required to report on websites and advertising that they are members of the 
bar.115  Some people object to professional licensing tout court.  Others think 
the bar’s standards are unnecessarily high and produce racially discriminatory 
effects.116  It seems strange to think such objections could ground a compelling 
claim against a requirement to reveal the details of one’s licensure (or lack 
thereof).  So long as an organization is not barred from also explaining why, 
in its view, the fact is itself irrelevant or objectionable, I do not see how the 
compelled articulation of it objectionably trespasses on their free speech in-
terest in articulating a message—especially given that the organization may, 
outside the service and goods context, advocate vociferously on the subject 
without making any compelled announcements.117 
4. Contested Relevance 
What about the fourth category in which the information’s relevance to 
the purposes for which the government may regulate is contested?  Might not 
this impinge on the free speech interest of the regulated party by garbling its 
 
 114. See, e.g.,  NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2381; see also Leading Cases, supra note 65, at 352–53. 
 115. The MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) prohibits the practice 
of law in jurisdictions in which the lawyer is not licensed, while some specific state rules, including 
MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(l) (STATE BAR OF MONT. ETHICS COMM. 2003), require the 
identification of jurisdictions in which a lawyer is licensed to practice when advertising legal services.  
Further, some state professional rules like the LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.6(b) (LA. ATT’Y 
DISCIPLINARY BD. 2018) require that all websites about a lawyer’s or firm’s services disclose all ju-
risdictions in which they are licensed to practice law. 
 116. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERICA 96–101 (1976) (describing the anti-Semitic and xenophobic motivations behind 
increased bar standards in the early twentieth century); Kristin Booth Glen, When and Where We En-
ter: Rethinking Admission to the Legal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696, 1711–15 (2002) (criti-
cizing the disparate impact of the bar examination on applicants of color); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Ste-
phen C. Ferruolo & David L. Faigman, California Needs a Task Force to Study the California Bar 
and Needs It Now, LAW.COM (May 28, 2019, 11:55 AM), https://www.law.com/there-
corder/2019/05/28/california-needs-a-task-force-to-study-the-bar-exam-and-needs-it-now/?slre-
turn=20200025160001 (arguing that California “cut scores” for the bar exam have a racially disparate 
impact).  See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE 
L.J. 491 (1985) (arguing that moral character requirements for bar licensing serve as a discriminatory 
and inconsistent filtering process). 
 117. But see Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
1475, 1498 (2018) (arguing that Justice Thomas correctly interpreted “uncontroversial” in NIFLA to 
mean the speech at issue covers a non-ideological matter). 
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message when it must include facts that it regards as irrelevant into its dis-
course? 
To examine this concern, we must isolate it carefully.  If “uncontroversial 
information” represents a distinct factor, then what is at issue is not whether 
the disclosure is in fact relevant or not, but whether, in addition, its relevance 
remains contested.  Recall that the “purely factual and uncontroversial infor-
mation” requirement is just one element of what Zauderer requires to impose 
a compelled disclosure.118  The requirements cannot be unjustified or unduly 
burdensome.119  Disclosure requirements must be “reasonably related to the 
State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers”120 or reasonably related 
to the State’s interest in ensuring informed consent.  Presumably, irrelevant 
information would serve neither aim.  For instance, in EMW Women’s Surgi-
cal Center, P.S.C. v. Beshear, the plaintiffs challenged whether information 
gleaned from an involuntary ultrasound was relevant to a patient’s medically 
informed consent.121  (But, they did not argue that their belief about (as op-
posed to the fact of) its irrelevance grounded a First Amendment complaint.) 
If the plaintiff cannot persuade a court that the disclosure fails, in fact, to 
serve the state interest because the disclosure is irrelevant to that interest, 
should it independently matter that the plaintiff or others nevertheless con-
tinue to contest its relevance?  Assuming the “purely factual and uncontrover-
sial” standard makes an independent contribution to the inquiry, then on this 
interpretation, although the plaintiff cannot convincingly show that the infor-
mation is irrelevant, the mere fact that the plaintiff contests the relevance of 
the factual information to achieving a state interest would purportedly under-
write a significant First Amendment objection to disclosing that information. 
This concern does not seem especially powerful, given that the require-
ment only arises with respect to the organization’s market activity and its pro-
vision of goods and services.  Any free speech concern is ameliorated by the 
fact that outside the service-provision context, no similar requirement may be 
imposed on the organization in its guise as a voluntary association.122  More-
over, the regulated party may identify the source of the contested fact in its 
 
 118. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
 121. 920 F.3d 421, 438 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 122. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573–74 
(1995). 
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articulation, e.g., “the government requires us to say that . . . .”123  So long as 
it is not deceptive, the organization may engage in other distancing behavior, 
including criticizing the requirement to speak and, in their own voice, criticiz-
ing the relevance of what they are required to articulate.  The organization 
also has reason to contest the relevance of facts in the political forum designed 
for the purpose of crafting and reconsidering regulations. 
Hence, there are ample opportunities to ensure that the market organiza-
tion is not misunderstood as endorsing the state’s position on the relevant facts 
and has the ability to advocate in the political forum that the regulations are 
unnecessary.  This leaves it unclear why, in the context of information pro-
vided to patients and consumers about a product or service, an organization’s 
view of the relevance of that information rises to the level of a First Amend-
ment freedom to refuse to offer it.  If it did, wouldn’t most organizations con-
test the relevance of disclosures?  Wouldn’t this empower them to decide for 
themselves whether consumers and patients need information that they were 
not otherwise inclined to provide?124  In other words, such an interpretation 
would transform a constraint on compelled disclosures into a constitutional 
power by an industry to decide for itself whether and how to subject itself to 
anti-deception and informed consent requirements. 
Surely, the fact of disagreement with a regulatory posture cannot amount 
to a claim of freedom of speech to ignore that regulation, as Masterpiece 
Cakeshop itself recognizes.125  In most democratic circumstances, the correct 
response to controversy, and what the First Amendment facilitates, is to listen, 
have an open mind, reconsider, discuss, advocate, persuade, and seek common 
ground where available.  The First Amendment is neither a provision that al-
lows for self-selection in the application of laws nor protection for manufac-
turing controversy so as, indirectly, to facilitate such self-selection.  In other 
words, the First Amendment underpins, rather than undermines, the rule of 
law. 
 
 123. See Greene, supra note 117, at 1491 (arguing that a private party forced to make disclosures 
has the right to announce that such statement is “not in [his or her] name”). 
 124. See Helen Norton, Powerful Speakers and Their Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 441, 467–68 
(2019) (criticizing a broad reading of NIFLA as insensitive to listeners’ informational interests). 
 125. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018) (not-
ing that philosophical and religious objections to same-sex marriage do not allow economic actors “to 
deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable 
public accommodations law”). 
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5. Contested Facts 
What of cases where the facts in the compelled disclosures are contested?  
Might not an organization object that compelled speech, in such a case, is 
tantamount to forcing it, from its own perspective, to lie by forcing it to voice 
something it takes to be untrue?  Isn’t the protection against forced mendacity 
fundamental to the First Amendment compelled speech protection? 
In thinking through this objection, it’s again important to get the case 
clear.  The “purely factual” prong already requires that the disclosure be ac-
curate.126  So, to make sense of the idea that the “uncontroversial information” 
prong is independent, we must imagine an organization that contests the truth 
of an accurate disclosure, but cannot refute the evidence that establishes its 
truth.  In such a case, the compelled disclosure does not force the speaker to 
say something speculative or known to be false, but rather something estab-
lished to be true but which the speaker nevertheless does not believe.  So de-
scribed, the situation is rife for manufactured controversy.  This interpretation, 
as with the relevance interpretation, threatens to permit any regulated entity 
to generate a free speech objection merely through asserting disagreement 
about the (proven) facts in a disclosure.  Even assuming the sort of good faith 
that has been absent in market actors’ representations of the facts concerning 
tobacco toxicity127 and climate change,128 to take two examples, the lopsided 
incentives for market agents to identify and admit facts against interest may 
substantially lag behind the evidence.129  Putting market agents in control of 
 
 126. Challenges about whether the disclosures are factual may merge with challenges to the need 
for compelled disclosures to prevent consumer deception.  Cf. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 
F.3d 628, 636 (6th Cir. 2010) (invalidating Ohio’s ban on identifying milk as produced from cows not 
treated by rbST because such identifications are not inherently misleading, but not hearing a direct 
challenge to the FDA’s suggested language). 
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding a decision 
finding Philip Morris liable for RICO violations involving conspiracy to defraud the public concerning 
nicotine addiction). 
 128. See, e.g., Sara Jerving, Katie Jennings, Masako Melissa Hirsch & Susanne Rust, What Exxon 
Knew About the Earth’s Melting Arctic, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), http://graphics.latimes.com/ 
exxon-arctic/ (documenting that Exxon was incorporating climate change projections into its plans 
while publicly denying that evidence of climate change was sufficient to warrant action). 
 129. See, e.g., Benjamin Franta, Shell and Exxon’s Secret 1980s Climate Change Warnings, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2018 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-
97-per-cent/2018/sep/19/shell-and-exxons-secret-1980s-climate-change-warnings (“[O]il firms rec-
ognized that their products added CO2 to the atmosphere, understood that this would lead to warming, 
and calculated the likely consequences.  And then they chose to accept those risks on our behalf, at 
our expense, and without our knowledge.”). 
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the mechanisms that activate their own regulation in the name of freedom of 
speech, rather than locating this power in government, seems irreconcilable 
with a regulated economy governed by the rule of law. 
Whereas, requiring disclosures that are true, purely factual, and serve im-
portant interests such as safety or informed consent, do not seem to impinge 
importantly upon freedom of speech.  Here, the distinctions between individ-
uals and organizations and between individuals and market agents matter.130  
Forcing a (human) person to attest to facts that she believes are false, in her 
capacity as an individual, implicates the previously discussed concerns about 
individual dignity, freedom of thought, and the recruitment of the speech fa-
cility to generate a tension between her speech and her moral integrity.  These 
concerns do not gain traction when the compelled disclosures are triggered by 
voluntarily undertaken market activity and limited to speech undertaken in the 
role of service or good provider, especially when the disclosure is required of 
an organization that may question the alleged fact in its other expressive ac-
tivities. 
To be sure, the fact of an organization’s continued skepticism about the 
purported fact is a reason for the organization to contest the finding of fact in 
the political and legal fora designed for that purpose.  The status of this pur-
ported fact may loom large in a group’s mission, and the contest over it may 
ground a principled resistance to articulating this fact.131  Such principled re-
sistance underscores the obligation of the government to deliberate carefully 
about the need for a compelled disclosure and the accuracy of the facts that 
underlie it as well as to reconsider it if the resistance is meritorious.132  But, 
the fact of principled resistance about a factual matter is not, in itself, a reason 
for the government to retreat in levying a justified restriction when the avail-
able evidence does not support the skepticism about the facts to be disclosed.  
In this case, the speech in question is just part of a larger regulatory framework 
governing service providers to ensure the safety and informed consent of cli-
ents and consumers. 
 
 130. See supra Part II.B. 
 131. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d. 628, 636–37 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 132. In the abortion context, there is much to reconsider about the content of compelled disclosures 
that have been upheld as constitutional.  See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 
ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1327 (discussing the inaccuracy of some compelled abortion disclosures, includ-
ing the myth that abortions increase suicidal thoughts). 
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6. Clarity and Nonmisleading Speech 
Of course, compelled disclosures should not be misleading, especially as 
one of their primary functions is to protect against consumer and patient de-
ception. Nonetheless, the idea that an “uncontroversial information” prong 
signals a requirement that disclosures are not to be misleading suffers diffi-
culties to those encountered with respect to the last three interpretations. 
First, it isn’t obvious that there is much of a connection between standard 
notions of controversiality and misleadingness.  A statement could be mis-
leading, and it might be roundly and uniformly condemned for so being.  So, 
misleading, but not controversially so.  Further, a highly effective misleading 
statement might operate below the radar.  It may go relatively unnoticed.  
Hence, it could be uncontroversial but also entirely misleading.  It’s difficult 
to know exactly what the connection between these concepts is supposed to 
be.  Perhaps the idea is that, in the relevant cases, there may be a controversy 
about whether the statement is misleading.  Proponents and authors of the dis-
closure may believe it to state facts in ways that appropriately inform readers; 
opponents of the disclosures may believe that they are written in ways that 
single out the wrong target or that falsely suggest the target is uniquely flawed 
or dangerous when it should not share that spotlight alone. 
The primary difficulty with this interpretation is that there is entirely too 
much risk, as with the relevance interpretation, that “controversiality” here 
will either do no work or do entirely too much work.  On the one hand, it 
seems to do no work.  If a plaintiff can establish that a disclosure is actually 
misleading, then it will fail to advance the state’s anti-deception aim and 
should flunk on the ground that it is “unjustified.”  Pointing out that it is also 
“controversial” adds nothing and seems beside the point.  Showing that others 
also question the wisdom of its wording should not be a prerequisite for the 
success of that challenge.  So again, this interpretation would fail to make 
sense of the idea that “uncontroversial information” represents an independent 
hurdle to the constitutionality of a compelled disclosure.  
Nor should citing others’ doubts about the clarity of a disclosure suffice 
to show the disclosure is misleading.  The plaintiff should have to substantiate 
an allegation that the disclosure is unjustified because it’s misleading, e.g., by 
producing evidence of consumer confusion, and not merely speculate about it 
by raising the possibility of an alternate, misguided interpretation.  The rubric 
of “controversiality” encourages an overly casual approach that permits sub-
stituting mere allegations that a disclosure is misleading or unclear with doing 
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the hard work of assessing whether those allegations are true.133 
7. A Common Problem: Exceptionalist Interpretations 
Institutional actors cannot be exempt from every requirement with which 
they disagree within a complex, democratic society that protects the rights and 
interests of all of its members.  When they choose to engage in market activ-
ities, the common interest in preserving consumers’ health, safety and auton-
omy bears on what they do.  When organizations choose to engage in practices 
that, in effect, suppress information or facilitate misunderstanding, their be-
havior runs at cross-purposes to the market’s functioning.  This problem, I 
have argued, plagues the last four interpretations of the “uncontroversial in-
formation” requirement (the controversial topics, contested relevance, con-
tested facts, and clarity interpretations).  From a free speech perspective, what 
matters for organizations is not that they agree with every regulatory rule that 
applies to them, including regulatory rules involving speech, but that they 
have sufficient breathing space in a substantial forum to articulate their own 
message in a way that may be understood as their own.  That free speech in-
terest is adequately satisfied by more robust protection of voluntary associa-
tions outside the market context and by limiting government speech regula-
tions to requirements of factual statements and disclosures, since that 
limitation tracks the justification of governmental oversight and does not im-
pose any forced orthodoxy of normative opinion or affirmation thereof.  To 
exclude “controversial” facts from compelled disclosures on First Amend-
ment grounds objectionably endorses a rather radical libertarian, bordering on 
anarchic, approach to government and a conflict- and issue-averse posture by 
government. 
Ironically, such an exclusion is wrong-headed from a market libertarian 
standpoint, since the justificatory basis for markets and the putative conditions 
for their well-functioning depend upon market actors being fully informed and 
making autonomous choices.  More important, it is wrong-headed from a civil 
libertarian standpoint.  The First Amendment prizes a demarcated libertarian-
ism about the mind, individual speech, and voluntary associations, but it is 
neither the thread that unravels collective government and regulation of the 
market, nor is it a demand that government insulate organizations from having 
to acknowledge inconvenient truths. 
 
 133. See, e.g., Masonry, 394 F. Supp. at 1304 (citing no evidence of consumer confusion). 
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8. “Uncontroversial information” as Uncontroversially-characterized 
Information 
This leaves the final category about controversial characterizations, about 
which there is more to be said on the First Amendment front.  I take it that the 
posture of the regulated party is not that it objects to the information or to the 
demand that it supply that information, but rather objects to how that infor-
mation is worded.134  Its objection is that a particular way of putting the infor-
mation may conflict with or obscure the organization’s own message—a form 
of garbling.  This issue did not arise in Zauderer or directly in NIFLA and, as 
noted earlier, is not really about the information as such, but rather to the dis-
closure’s wording.  Still, it poses an issue worth considering. 
Suppose there were more than one way to convey information, as there 
usually is, and that alternative ways were equally effective at making the in-
formation salient and conveying it effectively to (potential) clients, consum-
ers, and patients.135  Mightn’t an organization have a reasonable claim not to 
be forced to frame the fact in a way that undercuts its own message and to 
have a right to articulate that fact in its own way, assuming its own way is 
equally salient and conveys it equally effectively? 
Put in the abstract, it’s hard to resist this concern.136  The objection does 
not, at its core, suffer from the frailties that dog many of the prior interpreta-
tions.  Unlike the others, this objection does not implicitly challenge the au-
thority of the government to determine the relevant facts and subject matters 
calling for regulation.  This objection, in contrast with the others, responds to 
the features of the speech itself, rather than to the regulation that is imple-
mented through speech.  One can imagine a First Amendment doctrine that 
prevented enforcement of a compelled disclosure requirement specifying a 
particular script when the organization, instead, engaged in disclosure in its 
own voice and could demonstrate that its alternative was functionally equiva-
lent in terms of information conveyed and absorbed by the audience. 
When operationalized, however, difficulties could arise the 
 
 134. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018).  A 
related issue glancingly arose in NIFLA, with respect to the matter of how many languages the disclo-
sure had to appear in.  Id.  Whether the statute actually required articulation in multiple languages 
seemed to require further factual inquiry.  Id. at 2391–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  In any case, that 
question bears on whether the compelled disclosure interferes with an organization’s message, but the 
purported interference had to do more with bandwidth than with content.  See id. 
 135. See Corbin, supra note 132, at 1330–31. 
 136. See also Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEXAS L. REV. 355, 360 (2018). 
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administrability of this approach.  One can imagine countless disputes about 
whether the substituted speech by the regulated party really is the functional 
equivalent of the required script.  Substituting the term ‘abortifacient’ for 
‘birth control’ may arguably make the relevant information less salient by 
adding what may seem like a more sensationalist, distracting element or by 
deceptively suggesting that a feature of the IUD is highly relevant to the point 
of the disclosure when it is not.  (Taking more commercial examples, euphe-
mistically substituting ‘harvesting’ for ‘slaughter’ and using print messages 
rather than graphic portrayals of health hazards makes the relevant facts less 
salient and communicates their contents less effectively.)  These examples 
may seem like speakers’ efforts to evade the regulation, but one can think of 
potential examples with a less evasive character.  For instance, so-called in-
formed consent speeches that abortion providers must deliver might mention 
“the mother,” whereas a pro-choice provider might prefer “the pregnant pa-
tient.” 
Agencies like the FDA regularly issue guidelines about what sort of lan-
guage to use to communicate simply and effectively to the public.137  So, it 
isn’t unimaginable that agencies could review the substituted language of reg-
ulated parties.  On the other hand, were the environment to become rife with 
challenges and substitutes, it becomes more daunting to imagine how an ac-
commodation of the sort just sketched could succeed.  Because these are all 
cases in which the communication of the mission of an organization is at stake, 
it seems predictable that battles about compelled disclosures and functional 
equivalents would be fraught. 
Looking ahead, one can foresee an impasse.  There may be a legitimate 
First Amendment concern of organizations about being required to post or 
utter disclosures in their own voice but that are penned by state authors, in 
those cases when the disclosures use particular language that is fungible but 
that conflicts with the style or the message of the organization.  Yet, opera-
tionalizing an accommodation scheme could become administratively and ju-
dicially daunting. 
 
 137. See General and Cross-Cutting Topics Guidance Documents, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/Reg-
ulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm122044.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
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IV. GOVERNMENT SPEECH, REDUX 
A. Are Compelled Disclosures Governmental Speech? 
Contemplating this difficulty returns us to an earlier puzzle about NIFLA 
and to an earlier solution the Court took to an earlier impasse in the compelled 
speech arena.  The problem of controversial disclosures, as conceived in 
NIFLA, hinges on the framing that an organization is required to “speak,” but, 
at the same time, it is using a state-provided script.138  But it is unclear whether 
this is the correct conceptualization of these disclosures.139  Why not charac-
terize compelled disclosures involving state-provided scripts as, instead, re-
quirements that organizations post or distribute government speech when they 
provide services? 
 Conceptualizing compelled speech as government speech was the tech-
nique the Court deployed in Johanns to circumvent the tension between Glick-
man and United Foods.140  In 1997, Glickman held that compelled subsidies 
of generic advertising promoting stone fruit by a government-mandated agri-
cultural committee did not violate the First Amendment rights of stone fruit 
growers.141  Four years later, in 2001, United Foods held that compelled sub-
sidies of generic advertising promoting mushrooms by a government-man-
dated agricultural committee did violate the First Amendment rights of fungi 
growers.142  The purported difference did not reside in the special expressive 
interests of fungi growers, but in whether the advertising was part of a larger 
regulatory scheme.143 
Whatever the merits of that distinction, the weight placed on it appeared 
too great for the Court to bear.  Addressing a challenge to a similar set of 
 
 138. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. 
 139. See also Carl Wiersum, No Longer Business as Usual: FDA Exceptionalism, Commercial 
Speech, and the First Amendment, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 486, 530–52 (2018) (noting that the speech 
in NIFLA could have been construed as government speech). 
 140. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–62 (2005).   See also the use of this 
designation in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009), to negotiate tricky 
issues about selection procedures for installing permanent private gifts to a traditional public forum. 
 141. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 477 (1997) (holding that compelled 
funding of generic advertising of a regulated industry was permissible because the mandatory partici-
pation was “a species of economic regulation” that contributed to goals of an overall statutory scheme). 
 142. United States v. United Foods, Inc. 533 U.S. 405, 412–13 (2001) (departing from Glickman 
because the mandatory funds were for the purpose of generic advertising for an otherwise unregulated 
industry). 
 143. See id. at 415. 
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compelled subsidies for generic beef advertising, the Court in 2005 reconsid-
ered its approach and circumvented the First Amendment question by ruling 
that the advertising was government speech, and thus immune to First Amend-
ment challenge.144 
A similar maneuver characterized the Court’s approach to a challenge to 
state decisions to refuse applications for specialized license plates where those 
decisions were viewpoint-discriminatory.145  In Walker v. Texas Division, in 
a majority opinion joined by Justice Thomas (the author of the majority opin-
ion in NIFLA), the Court ruled that the specialized license plates were gov-
ernment speech and thus immune to First Amendment challenge.146  Given the 
similarities between license plates and compelled disclosures, it’s worth ex-
ploring whether a similar analysis should govern these compelled disclosures 
that might allow the state to achieve its health, safety, and informational pur-
poses without confronting the First Amendment conundrums associated with 
the manner of speech highlighted by the characterization interpretation. 
The surface similarities are strong.  Drivers are required to have license 
plates as a part of a regulatory scheme to ensure safety and accountability for 
engaging in an activity bearing significant social benefits and risks.  License 
plates bear information such as the state of registration of the car but may also 
bear personal messages on them.  The license plates must be publicly visible 
and are physically associated with the driver and a narrow circumference of 
the driver’s activity.  So, too, in cases like that presented in NIFLA, the dis-
closures were required as a condition of providing services, contained infor-
mation on them, and were visibly associated with the place of business.147 
The factors the Court applied to find that license plates were government 
speech also apply to (many) compelled disclosures that are scripted.  First, as 
with license plates, compelled scripted disclosures posted at a place of service 
or business are forms of speech that have long been used to convey 
 
 144. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61 (holding that even if the Secretary of Agriculture did not write 
the ad copy him or herself, the advertisements were government speech from “beginning to end” be-
cause they were directed by Congress and the Secretary). 
 145. See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253 (2015) 
(holding that license plates are government speech and not compelled private speech). 
 146. This was understandably surprising to many given Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1997).   
Wooley recognized a First Amendment right of an individual to cover up the portion of the New Hamp-
shire license plate design that featured the state motto, “Live Free or Die,” citing the compelled speech 
precedent from Barnette.  See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 147. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369 (2018) 
(outlining the relevant California law). 
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governmental messages.148  One need only think of requirements to post the 
closest fire escape, a restaurant’s health and cleanliness ranking, OSHA stand-
ards, and minimum wage guarantees.  Second, the state has direct control over 
the message’s content—that just follows from its being scripted.149  The trick-
iest factor has to do with whether observers identify the message with the state 
rather than with the compelled carrier.150 
In some ways, that factor holds more strongly, or may easily be satisfied, 
in the case of compelled disclosures at the site of service provision than with 
license plates.  After all, the compelled disclosures are more likely to be about 
true matters of state concern, in contrast with license plate messages such as 
“Rather Be Golfing!”  Compelled disclosures are also more likely to comple-
ment one another, by contrast with messages that are in tension with each 
other, as with those plates that endorse competing athletic teams.151 Further, 
compelled disclosures can be represented as originating from the state.  They 
may be issued on state letterhead or printed with the state seal.  They will have 
the same content in different places, and that regularity suggests the state and 
not the site is the author.  The service provider can also frame the disclosure 
as emanating from the state, not the service provider, whereas such cues and 
elaboration are somewhat more difficult to achieve in the fleeting glimpse an 
observer has of a license plate.152 
So, the Walker factors seem met in compelled disclosure cases like that 
confronted in NIFLA, where the state scripts the content of the disclosure. 
Regarding the disclosure as government speech would alleviate the First 
Amendment pressure posed by controversial characterizations of purely 
 
 148. See, e.g., Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248. 
 149. See, e.g., id. at 2249 (“Texas maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its spe-
cialty plates.”). 
 150. See id. at 2248 (“Texas license plate designs ‘are often closely identified in the public mind 
with the [State].’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).   Some empirical survey evidence sug-
gests that the public is no less likely to perceive expression as government speech simply because the 
expression is generated by private parties.  Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Public Per-
ceptions of Government Speech, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 80 (2017).  
 151. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 152. Still, most observers know the regulatory context in which license plates are required.  Further, 
drivers can make clear that the speech is not theirs by distancing themselves from the license plate’s 
message through counter-speech in the form of bumper stickers or, even, as in Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705, 715 (1997), to occlude aspects of the government speech that are not bound up with its 
regulatory ends.  See also Greene, supra note 117, at 1491 (contending that the “misattribution” danger 
is in fact fairly easy to manage, given the ability of observers to understand contexts in which speech 
does not reflect the views of the “speaker”). 
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factual material.153  Although the service provider might not select that lan-
guage as its own, the speech isn’t the speech of the service provider, and as is 
routinely recited, governmental speech is not directly subject to First Amend-
ment challenge on the grounds of viewpoint discrimination.154 
Strangely, the question of whether to frame state-scripted disclosures as 
government speech was not confronted in the NIFLA opinion.  Nor, oddly, 
was it addressed in a recent Ninth Circuit case in which the required disclosure 
identified the speech as that of the City of San Francisco: “Drinking beverages 
with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.  This is 
a message from the City and County of San Francisco.”155 
The issue was, however, taken up recently in Masonry Building Owners 
of Oregon v. Wheeler in a challenge to a state-scripted disclosure concerning 
the seismic hazards associated with unreinforced masonry.156  That court de-
clined to find the state-scripted disclosure government speech for two rea-
sons.157  First, whereas Walker and Pleasant Valley involved “private speech 
on government property,” this sort of compelled disclosure involves state ac-
tors speaking on or through a private channel, so to speak.158  Second, the 
compelled speech ordinance did “not provide for public funds to private 
 
 153. See supra Part III.C.8. 
 154. See, e.g., Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246 (refusing “[t]o hold that the Government unconstitution-
ally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance 
certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing those goals necessarily discourages alter-
native goals” (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991))); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 
555 U.S. 460, 479 (2009) (“If government entities must maintain viewpoint neutrality in their selection 
of donated monuments, they must either ‘brace themselves for an influx of clutter’ or face the pressure 
to remove longstanding and cherished monuments.”).  Also, consider Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 
70 (2006), which upheld the military’s right to recruit on Yale’s campus despite Yale’s objection to 
its (controversial) message and practice at the time of excluding gay people.  It arguably represents a 
“government speech” exception to the plurality decision of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Util-
ities Commission of California, 475 U.S. 1, 4, 20–21 (1986), which overturned a law requiring a pri-
vate speaker to distribute another party’s message.  See also Volokh, supra note 136, at 357, 362, 371–
77 (identifying the tension between the cases and identifying the factor that FAIR involves a govern-
ment speaker as possibly determinative).  
 155. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749, 753, 757–58 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(relying on NIFLA to overturn the denial of a preliminary injunction and finding a First Amendment 
challenge likely to win on the grounds that the compelled speech was unjustified and unduly burden-
some). 
 156. 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1293–96 (D. Or. 2019). 
 157. Id. at 1295. 
 158. Id. 
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entities to convey the government’s message.”159 
These arguments are unpersuasive.  It isn’t evident why it matters where 
the speech occurs.  It would be odd to think that speech is only government 
speech when it appears on government property.  That certainly isn’t true of 
individuals; my speech is my own even when I visit my neighbor or sit in a 
national park.  The Walker factors do not single out location as a necessary 
criterion for speech to be governmental;160 the license plates in question were 
on individuals’ cars.  Perhaps it is more likely that speech on governmental 
property will be associated with the government, but the connection is not 
exclusive; consumers, employees, and proprietors are accustomed to OSHA 
notices and restaurant health placards appearing at private workplaces.  Such 
notices are a common way the government communicates with the public. 
Neither does the source of funding seem critical.  Putting aside the fact 
that the government injects resources into the enforcement of compelled dis-
closure requirements, it does not seem that it would make any difference 
whether the license plate scheme in Texas was fully funded by license fees 
paid by private applicants or not.161 
B. Residual First Amendment Concerns 
There are other First Amendment hazards to compelling a speaker to be 
the vehicle of the government’s speech that merit attention.162  First, there are 
the issues associated with the dignity of the speaker.  Perhaps they are exac-
erbated when one must carry a governmental message on one’s own property 
or when one must fund its printing and display.  These issues seem, as argued 
above, more pressing in the case of individual speakers (and voluntary expres-
sive associations) than in the case of organizations in their roles as service and 
good providers.  In the latter case, the governmental interests are strong in 
ensuring the health, safety, and informed consent of their clients and the First 
Amendment objections against compelling a speaker to be a vehicle are di-
minished, at least so long as there is a nonarbitrary connection between the 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 2247. 
 161. Id. at 2251 (“In this case, as in Summum, the ‘government entity may exercise [its] freedom to 
express its views’ even ‘when it receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering 
a government-controlled message.’” (alteration in original)). 
 162. See supra Part II.B. for a discussion of free speech values at stake with compelled speech, 
particularly for institutions and market agents. 
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government speech and the compelled speaker’s market activities.163 
Second, there are issues associated with ensuring that the regulated 
party’s speech is not garbled or displaced in virtue of its carriage of the gov-
ernment’s speech. As in Zauderer, with respect to a commercial, for-profit 
speaker, the speech interests of the nonprofit service provider seem protected 
so long as: it can distinguish its speech from the speech of the state (thereby 
protecting its own message from being garbled); the state speech is not so 
lengthy, prominent, or irrelevant so as to displace the regulated party’s 
speech;164 and the state only requires the disclosure of factual, nonnormative 
information that non-arbitrarily serves justified interests.165  The latter require-
ment ensures both that the primary message of the speech is nonopinionated 
and that it is sufficiently limited in scope.  That scope limitation may also help 
to ensure that the organization’s speech is not eclipsed by the government 
speech, and its non-normative nature also mitigates the severity of any con-
cerns about being treated as a vehicle for the government’s ideological mes-
sage. 
Finally, even though government speech may itself express a viewpoint 
without raising First Amendment hackles, First Amendment concerns may 
arise if its selection criteria for who must carry the speech discriminate on 
illicit, viewpoint-based grounds.166  Indeed, although Justice Kennedy’s con-
currence was not using a government speech lens, it did press allegations of 
viewpoint discrimination with respect to the selection criteria of the regulated 
parties.167  Justice Breyer’s dissent offered a persuasive rebuttal, connecting 
the identities of the regulated parties and their audience closely with the state 
interests in promulgating the speech.168 
Whichever side of that dispute has the better of the latter argument, notice 
that what is at issue between the concurrence and the dissent has nothing to 
do with whether the compelled speech has controversial content in any of the 
senses that go beyond the meaning that merely underscores and reinforces 
 
 163. See supra Part II.B. 
 164. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S. F., 916 F.3d 749, 753, 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding 
that the City of San Francisco failed to show that a mandatory disclosure covering 20% of an adver-
tisement would not drown out the advertiser’s message). 
 165. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); supra Part III.A. 
 166. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2361 (2018). 
 167. Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 168. Id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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“purely factual.”169  Indeed, the concerns about governmental speech garbling, 
drowning out, or displacing a speaker’s message also have nothing to do with 
whether the compelled speech has controversial content or concerns a contro-
versial matter. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The NIFLA decision is perplexing.  It covertly reinterprets the require-
ment that compelled disclosures contain only “purely factual and uncontro-
versial information” in a way that bears little relationship to the meaning and 
motivations behind the standard articulated in Zauderer.170  The failure to 
acknowledge this extension from a redundant standard to a true conjunctive 
represents a missed opportunity in at least two ways.  First, by failing to pro-
vide a strong rationale for why “uncontroversial information” should operate 
as a distinct prong of the analysis in the case of requiring nonprofit service 
providers to follow a script, the Court lapsed into an implausible application 
of that prong.171  It implicitly appeared to embrace the idea that the govern-
ment cannot require service providers to acknowledge and inform patients and 
consumers of services and practices that some may find controversial.172  This 
is an untenable and unwieldy idea, one that is in fundamental tension with the 
necessities of governmental regulation in a politically diverse environment. 
Second, the Court failed to provide substantive guidance about what 
counts as “controversial” and what qualifies as “uncontroversial infor-
mation.”173  As the seven distinct interpretations analyzed in this Article tes-
tify, many disparate notions may fall under that label that should be distin-
guished.174  Most factual, but “controversial” disclosures should not trigger 
First Amendment scrutiny at all, at least so long as the First Amendment is 
not interpreted as a right to exemption from general laws with which one dis-
agrees. 
Further, the tangles of administrability posed by those circumstances in 
which a genuine First Amendment concern may arise about disfavored or con-
tested wording and style could prove difficult to unravel.  Rather than rushing 
 
 169. Id. at 2379 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 170. See supra Part II.; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626. 
 171. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 172. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 173. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2361 (2018). 
 174. See supra Part III. 
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to confront them, the Court might take a page from its recent past and avoid 
the constitutional questions by taking the highly reasonable position that com-
pelled, government-authored disclosures in the service of health, safety, or in-
formed decision-making constitute government speech.175  In which case, 
there may be little reason to forge far beyond the descriptive interpreta-
tion of Zauderer—that “purely factual and uncontroversial information” re-
fers to purely factual speech relating well-established facts.176  Under this 
analysis, any remaining free speech concerns of service providers who are 
compelled to post government-written disclosures can be met by requiring 
that the state speech be clearly labeled in ways that allow recipients to identify 
its source, by ensuring that there is adequate room for the preferred speech of 
service providers outside of the service provision context, and by permitting 
service providers to distance themselves from and criticize the state speech in 
question, so long as the compelled disclosures receive sufficient prominence 
to communicate the government’s message. 
Thus, whether compelled disclosures involve information that is contro-
versial in any meaningful sense should play no distinctive role in the First 
Amendment analysis.177  Like other controversies, the dispute over what 
counts as “uncontroversial information” will only prove a time-consuming 
distraction that detracts from resolving real issues about how to protect con-
sumers and patients while allowing adequate space for institutional actors to 
express their own nondeceptive messages. 
  
 
 175. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 176. See id. 
 177. See Part III.C. 
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*** 
